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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-BAR TO SUIT BEFORE
TORT OCCURS
A Connecticut statute' provides that no action for personal injury shall
be brought after one year from date of act or omission complained of.
In a suit for personal injury due to negligence in the manufacture of a
rifle, defendant pleaded that the action accrued at the time of the manufacture and the action was barred by the Statute of Limitations. Plaintiff
asserted that the action accrued at the time of the harm. Held, "Act or
omission" applied to the original defective manufacture and operated to bar
any action subsequent to one year after the date of the manufacture, regardless of the time when the injury occurred. Dincher v. Martin Firearms
Co., 198 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1951).
There is no fixed rule as to when a cause of action accrues. The statute
in each case must be considered 2 and the courts must look to the language
of the statute to determine its meaning. 3 Some states hold that limitation
statutes should be interpreted very liberally 4 while others maintain they
should be strictly construed. 5 In construing the language of statutes apparently unambiguous, the courts have tended to avoid a literal interpretation where they believed that it would yield an inequitable result." Generally, the test of when the statutory period begins to run is either when the
defendant commits his wrong7 or, when substantial harm matures.8 If defendant's original conduct invades the plaintiff's rights, so that the suit
could be maintained regardless of actual damage (as in the case of trespass),
the statute commences upon the completion of the conduct. But if harm
is deemed the gist of the action, the occurrence of the actual harm marks
the beginning of the period. 9
In at least one state it has been held that the limitation runs from the
time of the negligent conduct, despite recognition of the fact that not even
nominal damages are recoverable prior to the time harm is suffered. Thus,
if the interval prior to the maturation of the harm exceeded the statutory
period the cause of the action was barred) 0 The effect of this rule has frequently been to bar the plaintiff's action not only before he sustained any
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CASES NOTED
perceptible harm, but before it was feasible for him to learn that the negligence had taken place."
The contrary view is that no statute of limitation will run against a
person until he is allowed by law to do the things to which the statute is
directed. 12 A cause or right of action accrues, so as to start the statute running, when the right to institute and maintain a suit arises, and not before. 13 The accrual has been said to depend on the uniting of at least two
elements-in jury and damages. 14
In the instant case the court construed the language of the statute 5
very strictly. The court felt the intention of the legislature was clearly
manifested by the change of the language "injury or neglect" in a prior
statute to "act or omission" in the revised statute. The dissenting opinion
expresses the belief that it is a legal "axiom" that a statute of limitation does
not begin to run before a cause of action exists, i.e., before a judicial remedy is available to the plaintiff.' 7 Furthermore, it is asserted that the phrase
"act or omission" is a synonym for "injury or neglect"; that the reason for
the change of language in the revised statute was merely for uniformity of
language between the various tort statutes; and therefore, the change was
not significant.
It is a convenient rule that knowledge of a wrong is immaterial in most
cases involving statutes of limitation where some harm would be apparent
to one using ordinary care, Where the neglect is indeterminable before
the injury (and surely in this case it was so) the inequities of depriving the
plaintiff of an effective remedy should prevent a decision such as this.',
Theoretically, an interpretation as in the instant case could open the door
to fnud. A manufacturer or his retail outlet would only have to store any
article for one year before sale to be completely absolved of liability. Surely
this could not be the intent of the legislature. 19 The policy behind a limitations statute is to prevent one who "sleeps upon his rights" from bringing
an action.20 There can be no reason for penalizing one who "sleeps on a
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right" he does not have, but this is the result of the decision in the instant
case.
Lawrence 1. Hollander

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-DISABILITIES AS TOLLING
LIMITATION PERIOD
A city ordinance provides that "no suit shall be maintained against
the city ... for any tort unless ... written notice of such damage was, within
thirty (30) days after receiving of the injury alleged given to the city
attorney . . ."' In suit for personal injury caused by the negligence of a city
employee, the city pleaded notice had not been given within the time
allowed. Plaintiff requested permission to show that she was unconscious
as a result of her injury for the full thirty day period, and could not
fulfill the requirement as to notice. Held, one rcndered unconscious by an
act charged to have resulted from the negligence of the city, and who
remains unconscious as a result of that act for the full period allowed for
the giving of notice will not be precluded from recovery because of failure
to comply with the statute. City of Miami Beach v. Alexander, 61 So. 2nd
917 (1952).
In many instances limitation statutes contain saving clauses or exceptions infavor of persons under physical or mental disability which toll the
statute until the disability is removed.2 In recent years the courts have
loathed to interpose exceptions not expressly made by the legislature,3
however reasonable or equitable such exceptions may seem. 4 The courts
feel that such conduct would invade and obstruct the function and purpose
of the legislative branch of government." The result of this attitude is to
bar a pcrson from maintaining an action if he fails to give notice within
the prescribed period regardless of his disability.0
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Mass. 522, 90 N.E. 927 (1910); Ray v. St. Paul, 44 Minn. 340, 46 N.W. 675 (1890);
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68 Pac. 386 (1902).
3. Barret v. Mobile, 129 Ala. 179, 30 So. 36 (1901); Williams v. Jacksonville,
118 Fla. 671, 160 So. 15 (1935); Buss v. Kemp Lumber Co., 23 N.M. 567, 170 Pac. 54
(1918); Rowray v. McCarthy, 48 Vyo. 108. 42 P.2d 54 (1935).
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145 Pao. 73 (1914); Ransom v.South Bend, 76 Wash. 396, 136 Pac. 365 (1913).

